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Becker (1964) at the University of Chicago originated the idea of human capital theory. In	  
Becker’s understanding of the theory the individual is repositioned—as an actor in the social 
world—in the market of behaviors. According to his theory, as a rational actor, the individual 
optimizes his or her own “profit” by accumulating those behaviors and skills that make him or 
her more desirable on the market. At the heart of the theory lies the possibility of perfecting the 
human (Luke, 1997). By translating behavior into economic terms, human capital theory enabled 
the systematic application of economic theory to social issues, such as unemployment or the 
issue of minorities who dominated in lesser-skilled occupations. While this theory construes the 
individual in terms of two components, first, genetic endowment and second, acquired set of 
aptitudes (Besley & Peters, 2007), more emphasis in policy making has been placed on how best 
to facilitate the acquisition of knowledge and aptitudes. Education, training, and parenting under 
the influence of policies using human capital reasoning became aligned with market goals and 
applied market terms, such as investment, return, competition, and so on. 
Neuroscientific arguments gained increased significance in early childhood education and 
care (ECEC) discourse internationally, including policy, theory, and practice during the past 
decade (White, 2011). While human capital reasoning continued to provide a commanding 
rationale for policy efforts in early care and education (Press, Wong, & Sumsion, 2012), 
neuroscientific evidence offered new ways to legitimize policy on all parts of the political 
spectrum. It also offered authoritative evidence to underpin stakeholders’ advocacy work. This 
3 
chapter is a critical engagement with the current popularity and uncritical uptake of neuroscience 
discourses in early childhood policy through some examples of Australian ECEC policy and 
practice. While neuroscience discourses offer uncontested power to arguments for the provision 
of early childhood education, it is also possible that these discourses will lead to unexpected 
outcomes. They potentially threaten the value placed on pedagogical work aimed at the 
acquisition of aptitudes and focus on bringing out genetic endowments of the individual leading 
to a new eugenic current. It might potentially lead to disinvestment from institutional delivery of 
care and education, and to a radical change in pedagogy and curricula that targets new capacities 
of the individual through pharmaceutical drugs and/or various novel technologies. 
Human Capital and Neurosciences in Policy 
Ball and Junemann (2012, p. 4) write that “governance networks bring into play particular kinds 
of expert knowledge, ranging from industrial psychology to auditing, which” inform and shape 
policy discourses by constructing policy problems and interventions in particular ways. 
Governance networks are made up of interdependent actors—often extra governmental entities—
involved in delivering provisions based on the exchange of money, information, and expertise 
and rely on lasting ties and networks between expertise, reputation, and legitimation. In this 
context, policy discourses construct and position human subjects as actors and affected entities in 
particular ways according to the expert knowledges they draw upon and get shaped by. As 
human capital theory continues to be utilized in governance networks, it interacts with other 
expert knowledges, such as neuroscience, that gained reputation and legitimation recently (Kraft, 
2012; MacNaughton, 2004) and reconfigured notions of the human subject as actors and affected 
entities in early years policy discourses. 
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As Ball and Junemann (2012, p. 3) explain, network structures define the agenda, 
including the problem and outcomes of policy networks. ECEC network structures in Australia 
include in both their “issue networks” and “tight policy communities” economists and 
neuroscientists or their representatives.1 ECEC policy is shaped by neuroscience research quite 
explicitly since the Rudd and Gillard governments’ “education revolution” agenda, which 
specifically focused on ECEC and intended to bring significant changes in education policy and 
practice to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. The subsection of “education 
revolution,” the ECEC agenda titled as Investing in the Early Years—a National Early 
Childhood Development Strategy (referred to as “Strategy” in the following text) released by the 
Council of Australian Governments in 2009 contains explicit references to neuroscientific 
evidence in a seamless whole with human capital theory to condition the future of the child: 
National effort to improve child outcomes will in turn contribute to increased social 
inclusion, human capital and productivity in Australia. It will help ensure Australia is 
well placed to meet social and economic challenges in the future and remain 
internationally competitive. 
Our understanding of the interactions between genetics and early childhood experiences 
has advanced through research in neurobiology which highlights the importance of the 
early years in shaping the architecture of the brain. (Council of Australian Governments, 
2009, p. 4) 
This Strategy served as the basis to write the new national curriculum and quality framework for 
the early years that radically reshaped policy, curriculum, and provision. Moreover, it shaped 
new kinds of ECEC actors—parents and educators as responsible for the neuro-health of children 
and children as “embrained” subjects (Lemke, 2005). As referred to in the Strategy, neuro-health 
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practices of families and caregivers condition the future of the child by setting “trajectories for 
learning and development throughout life” (Council of Australian Governments, 2009, p. 29). As 
part of scientific evidence, early brain development argues for “optimal” stimulation in the early 
years so that brain synapses and pathways develop to their optimal capacities. Evidence in regard 
to hardwiring and pruning processes taking place in the brain legitimates and provides powerful 
arguments for policy initiatives, funding, and intervention in many policy fields related to the 
early years. Intertwined with the future focus of human capital theory, neuro-health therefore 
became a part of ensuring Australia’s competitiveness on the international market. 
In this chapter, I analyze the ways in which neuroscientific discourses entangled with 
human capital theory have reshaped or are reshaping the notion of the human subject and 
affected entity in ECEC policies and practices. What are or could be the possible consequences 
of these entanglements for the government of different sections of population? This timely 
analysis follows developments in which neurosciences already effectively shape educational 
knowledge production and the very nature of the child to be educated and cared for. They offer 
novel ways to think about and problematize education and care often turning back to biological 
theories and eugenic arguments (Edwards, Gillies, & Horsley, 2013; Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013). 
Methodological Considerations 
Governmentality is a complex term coined by Foucault (1991). Briefly, it is about “how we think 
about governing others and ourselves in a wide variety of contexts” (Dean, 1999, p. 209). 
Governmentality or governmental rationality refers to particular “mentality[ies]” of rule. 
Foucault signals the emergence of a distinctive mentality of rule that became the basis for 
modern liberal politics making the freedom of the individual the target of government. Different 
mentalities offer different ways to think about governing individuals and are associated with 
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various avenues, or technologies, for their regulation in the form of policies or ritualized and 
routinized institutional practices, that is, regimes of practices. It presupposes understandings of 
the governed subject. These constitutions assume certain capacities, attributes, orientations, and 
statuses of its subjects. The provision of ECEC, with its associated policy and pedagogical and 
curriculum regimes, is considered a technology for the regulation of conduct in order to align it 
with changing aims of governing. 
Human capital theory’s future-oriented focus makes it a strategy for governing the 
population toward certain ends by connecting goals of education with a future societal aim. At 
the same time it also serves as a technology of anticipation with its cost-benefit analysis that 
seeks “to bring some aspects [of the future] about and to avoid others” (Rose & Abi-Rached, 
2013, p. 14). To demonstrate how human capital theory changed its shape, constructed shifting 
notions of the human subject, and affected entity in policy, I provide a short historical review of 
models of human capital in Australian education policy. These models draw on Luke’s (1997) 
analysis. I demonstrate how developments in (expert) knowledge production and its uptake in 
policies altered the ways in which the human capital model constructed problems, made them 
intelligible, and shaped interventions. I briefly point to what understandings of human being, 
child subjects, or “natural foundations” these interventions were administered through, offering 
some examples for these narratives from historical Australian ECEC policies. Then, by using the 
same analytical strategy, I describe the knowledge production associated with the neurosciences 
and draw out some considerations as to their possible effects when they entangle with human 
capital theory. Thus, the “findings” in this chapter are speculative and they aim to trouble the 
mostly unproblematic uptake and unfettered promotion (Sripada, 2012) of neuroscientific 
discourses in ECEC globally in general and in the Australian context in particular (see 
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exemptions, e.g., Corrie, 2000; Einboden, Rudge, & Varcoe, 2013, in the health area; 
MacNaughton, 2004; Pykett, 2012, on geographies of contemporary educational practice; and 
Sumsion & Grieshaber, 2012, in the Australian ECEC). 
Expert knowledge has power effects and shapes what is possible to say, think, and do in 
relation to the child (Foucault, 1972). Expert discourses construct particular notions of “the 
child” as the subject of education and care. They define the child’s capacities (or the lack of 
thereof) and assign techniques to effect those to reach particular goals. The inclusion of 
neuroscientific knowledge into ECEC has made visible particular biological processes, such as 
brain activity or hormone levels, which I explain in more detail later in this chapter. This 
inclusion reconfigured (Sripada, 2012) the educational and care knowledge of the human body 
and biological processes, and made them the target of regulation. For example, it is not only the 
biological needs of the child, such as eating, toileting, resting, and so on that are targeted by care 
practices but seemingly hidden processes of the body, such as brain activities and stress levels. 
Neuroscientific knowledge therefore reconfigured the child as the subject of education by 
visualizing and assigning novel neural and biological capacities to them that were previously not 
considered in policy and practice. Mirroring these changes, educators are also changing to 
facilitate optimal brain development and stimulate hormonal and neural processes. 
Luke (1997) borrowed Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of the “machine” to understand the 
human subject in human capital theory “as a generic, infinitely perfectable industrial-era 
machine” (p. 5). The metaphor of the machine becomes useful for emphasizing how different 
forms of governing mandates shape both the subject (the individual) and the working of the 
machine (by assigning capacities and related actions), simultaneously producing particular power 
effects on the conduct of the individual (Foucault, 1991). Foucault’s analytics of government 
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established a close link between forms of power and processes of subjectification and forms of 
knowledge underpinning them. In this perspective governmentality stresses the close link 
between technologies of power, technologies of subjectivation, and forms of knowledge (1991). 
For the analysis performed in this chapter I have found Fejes’s (2006, p. 697) concept of 
the “educable subject” helpful. The educable subject expresses the relationship between a 
particular mandate, rationality of governing, where the subject is constructed as the target of this 
particular form of regulation that is directed on certain capacities. The subject is understood 
according to the same rationality. For example, if the subject is characterized by stress level or 
choice, regulation aims to govern the stress level or choice of the subject. I have also adapted 
Fejes’s (p. 698) questions for the purpose of my analysis: How are educable subjects constructed 
as beings with certain capacities (or the lack of thereof) and what are they to become? What 
kinds of techniques have been created to govern these subjects? How does human capital theory 
interplay with neuro-health knowledges in the construction of the educable subject? How can 
care and education be speculatively imagined for these child subjects? My analysis is not based 
on a comprehensive analysis of discourses in a marked area and era, or on a full review of 
literature, rather it offers a review and speculative creation of a series of possible scenarios to 
explore and critique (and destabilize) the possible effects of neuro discourses in ECEC. 
Three Historical Models of Human Capital 
In Luke’s (1997) iteration the first model of human capital was most prevalent during the 
Dawkins era (1987–1992) in Australia. Educational narratives, by drawing on social scientific 
knowledge in regard to social structure and disadvantage, constituted particular subjects as 
“unskilled” and “disenfranchised” due to their social position in society. The aim of 
governments was to ensure the future competitive productivity of these workers and their social 
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mobility through some form of compensatory education. The Strengthening Australia’s Schools 
document (Dawkins, 1988) stated that a national effort must produce a skilled and reliable 
workforce to reform the economy. Most efforts were focused on the upper end of schooling and 
resulted in a decrease in funding for preschool (Ailwood, 2004). The reasoning of this model 
goes back to the social planners of the 1960s in the United States, who also initiated Head Start 
programs, which were mirrored in Australian early childhood education as compensatory 
education during the 1970s (Millei, 2008). For example, the Nott Report in Western Australia 
summarizing the state and need for ECEC expresses the need to compensate for “many under-
privileged, mentally and physically retarded children and children whose need for pre-school 
education is so pressing but who are for a variety of reasons not in a position to avail themselves 
of it” (Education Department of Western Australia, 1972, p. 2). Its counterpart, the Fry Report, 
initiated the support of migrant and Aboriginal communities to establish their own preschool 
centers “in which the program is partially orientated to their cultural and linguistic heritage” 
(Australian Pre-schools Committee, 1974, p. 221). Hence, lack of participation in society and 
workforce was understood on structural terms related to one’s belonging to a particular social 
group. The individual was constructed on social categories based on these divisions and 
associated “deficits.” Education focused on the identification, quantification, and categorization 
of lack and the filling of that lack as a social and economic project. Educational funding aimed 
toward the reorganization and redistribution of knowledge. 
The second narrative described by Luke (1997) repositions deficits generally onto all 
human subjects. It does so by removing their belonging to certain social categories. With the 
perception that certain types of knowledge and skills were necessary for the purposes of industry, 
this way of thinking reshapes our understanding of the subject in terms of the possession or lack 
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of specific skills necessary for employment, making that individual productive or not. People 
were now seen in terms of their ability to adapt to these needs. The introduction of outcomes-
based education exemplifies this discourse where potentials (and deficits) were articulated in 
clear standards: outcome-based education offered “potential in the clear articulation of ‘what’s 
important’ and the commitment to ensuring that all groups of students, regardless of their class, 
gender, race, ethnicity, physical ‘ableness’, and so on, are expected to achieve at high levels on a 
common curriculum” (Willis & Kissane, 1995, p. 3). Education and training became closely 
intertwined. Outcomes were defined as matched with employment requirements and discursive 
markers from management were used such as “targets,” “benchmarks,” “reporting,” and 
“outcomes” (Taylor, Rizvi, Lingard and Henry, 1997). The compensatory model of “equality of 
opportunity” turned to “equity of access and participation” for all (Marginson, 1993). 
In ECEC, compensatory education shifted to the need for early intervention coupled with 
early investment and return based on the aim to increase individual employability and savings on 
welfare spending (Millei, 2008). The aim of education became to deposit or strengthen these 
employment related skills in all children, linking education with ensuring economic 
reform/outcomes by increasing individual skill levels for employment requirements. The child 
subject was reconstituted as the future employable worker. 
In the third narrative about human capital theory, “national economic survival and 
competition in the world economy have come increasingly to be seen as questions of cultural 
reconstructions” in terms of enterprise and the “acquisition and use of so-called entrepreneurial 
qualities” (Peters, 2001, p. 60). This knowledge—enterprise culture—constitutes creativity and 
entrepreneurship as important aspects of the subject reflecting the context of risk and knowledge 
society and mechanisms for risk and knowledge management. Constructed as being part of the 
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international knowledge economy and culture, industrialized nations were concerned about 
assurances against risks in changing international markets—for example, quality assurance, 
monitoring, regulation, centralized planning, and evaluation—that were seen to be secured by 
individuals’ creativity and entrepreneurship. Backing Australia’s Ability uses this rationale the 
following way: “A road of high growth based on the value of our intellectual capital, we need to 
stimulate, nurture and reward creativity and entrepreneurship” (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2001, p. 2). These new discourses also constituted a novel type of school leaver, “an economic 
citizen that was better attuned to the requirements of an enterprise culture” (Marginson, 1997, p. 
154). For example, the Guidelines for the Identification of Best Practice in Early Childhood 
Education for Four to Eight Year Olds (Guideline) promotes “positive attitudes towards risk 
taking” (Rice, Shortland-Jones, & Meney, 2001, p. 8). The child is constituted by the Guideline’s 
discourses as being able to choose between activities that best support her educational 
advancement, as being able to shape and govern her own capacities and competencies through 
her own will and choice, and as being an autonomous and lifelong learner (Millei, 2008). The 
second edition of the Guideline (Rice, Shortland-Jones, & Meney, 2006) introduces the idea of 
career development for early childhood. Against dominant discourses that position young 
children as innocent and needing protection, this document repositions children as part of adult 
world who from the beginning of their lives learn to and are liable to succeed. The Guideline 
explicates this idea this way: 
Career development involves actively taking charge of one’s learning/work/life destiny in 
a complex, changing world. It is about creating the life one wants to live and the work 
one wants to do. An integral component of this process is self-management through ever-
changing contexts and circumstances of an individual’s life and work journeys. (p. v) 
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As was well summarized by the words of the Curriculum Framework’s (for Western Australia 
incorporating the early years): “All students need to attain [these outcomes] in order to become 
lifelong learners, achieve their potential in their personal and working lives and play an active 
part in civic and economic life” (Curriculum Council, 1998). Human capital theory through 
individual enterprise and creativity sought to mitigate risk for economic competitiveness of the 
nation. 
Neurosciences and Biopolitics 
The National Agenda for Early Childhood (Agenda) (Commonwealth of Australia, 2007) in 
Australia was the first national collaborative approach for ECEC among state governments, 
departments, the nongovernment sector, and the community that created a vision and framework 
for the early years. The Agenda lays down priorities for “evidence-based and coordinated action 
which will result in improved health, learning, and emotional and social wellbeing of children, 
both during the early years and over the course of their lives,” extending the agenda and policy 
initiatives to an approach integrating education with health and well-being (p. 16). The creation 
of a national framework for ECEC contributed to a strong economic program as it was placed 
under the national productivity agenda. It aimed to increase efficiency and reduce spending by 
overseeing and coordinating the various sectors engaged in “child work,” by preempting the 
future overspending on welfare in areas of health and social security. 
Scientific discourses, especially research conducted on early brain development by 
McCain and Mustard (McCain & Mustard, 1999; Mustard, 2002) or the study of Shonkoff and 
Phillips (2000), were also included in the Agenda as well as in other related policy discourses to 
support economic arguments and to emphasize the great role that the parents and the community 
play in children’s development and well-being. Thus the regulation of ECEC was extended to 
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new players in its governance network (Ball & Junemann, 2012). The use of brain research as a 
“regime of truth” and associated authority,” as MacNaughton (2004) argues, helped to legitimate 
the need for ECEC.  Against the “noisiness” of social research with humans in which the context 
and complex nature of the subject alters research findings to a great extent, brain research 
simplifies findings into linear causality.  It articulates that optimum brain development ensured 
by the most favorable physical and personal environment results in productive and healthy 
adulthood. Other factors, such as social disadvantage, acting upon adult productivity are not 
considered or are disregarded in these arguments. 
As I have demonstrated in the three models, human capital theory provided the basic link 
between particular desired human behaviors, their acquisition, and economic aims. As human 
capital theory mixed with particular knowledges—social compensation, industry skills (early 
intervention), or enterprising culture—different models were produced that constructed the 
problem, subjects of the problem, the learner and the child, the solution (attempt), and outcome 
in particular ways. So what are the effects when neuroscientific discourses entangle with human 
capital theory? 
Neurosciences and their sibling fields of biomedicine and biosciences, target and expand 
knowledge from the person as an entity to the internal processes of the body. While human 
capital theory has targeted certain aptitudes of the individual, neurosciences help to make visible 
the internal mechanisms of the body for regulation. For example, while so far creativity was 
attributed to the individual, it became possible to conceive of it as a particular operation of the 
human brain. Thus these new imaginings of the person shape novel subjects and ways to govern 
individuals or the population en masse. 
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Since government moved into new areas, such as the regulation of the population’s 
biological processes and aims to control and enhance the population to multiply and increase the 
capacities of the body to be more productive, Foucault’s notion of biopolitics needs to be 
reconsidered. Biopolitics treats the “population” as a mass with biological characteristics and 
particular kinds of pathologies that give rise to specific knowledges and techniques for its 
regulation. In biopolitics life appears as the object of political strategies and takes as its subject 
the human body and its biological processes. According to Foucault, a biopolitics of the human 
race began to emerge as the state became concerned with the population as a commodity that 
needed to be governed so as to protect, preserve, and fortify it and its capacities (Foucault, 1978). 
Children’s bodies are understood as a biological resource, where the aim of government is to 
control the health and welfare of the population so that overall productivity can be increased. In 
particular, biopower (2007) and discourses of childhood exert a futurity in relation to children 
(Jenks, 1996), since it concerns their future well-being as economic citizens (Popkewitz & 
Bloch, 2001). Biopower carries a specifically biological aspect as it is concerned with increasing 
the body’s utility, and therefore the health, well-being, and productivity of the population, 
through the acquisition and development of particular capacities. Biopower is exercised over 
young bodies so that their productivity and individuality are constituted in ways that are 
connected with issues of national policy, including economic processes. 
However, neuro- and biomolecular knowledges go beyond the borders of the body and 
open new spaces for intervention that not only alter metabolic processes (e.g., enabling better 
concentration/attention) but also their programming. As Lemke proposes, biopolitics needs to be 
reconsidered to understand the current constellations of power. Lemke (2005, p. 6) citing 
Rheinberger (1996, S. 25) argues, “For the first time, it is on the level of instruction that 
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metabolic processes are becoming susceptible to manipulation. Until that point was reached, 
medical intervention, even in its most intrusive physical, chemical and pharmacological forms, 
was restricted to the level of metabolic performance.” It is no longer about taking Ritalin and 
making the child less “agitated” but about alleviating the cause entering into and reprogramming 
the child’s mind. By reshaping notions of the individual that are now represented in the form of 
manipulable biological processes, new governing mandates attach themselves to existing 
techniques for the regulation of bodies and minds, such as those of the “psy” sciences 
(psychology, psychiatry, etc.) (Rose, 1989). Like the changes psychology effected in our way of 
thinking throughout the twentieth century, neurosciences, biomedicine, and biosciences form a 
“new regime of truth about our nature as human beings” (Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013, p. 227) and 
potentially reconfigure and make intelligible otherwise individual and collective problems. 
By the turn of the twenty-first century, neurosciences became a repository of hope, 
attaching to many “sites and practices that were colonized only earlier by psychology”—such as 
child development or learning theories—from early childhood education to child rearing and 
began to transform them in significant ways (Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013, p. 9). Neurosciences 
reconceptualized personhood with the idea of the neuromolecular (describing the brain’s 
anatomy and physiology), plastic (brain’s mutability across life span), and visible brain (made 
possible by animal research and visualization technologies) (2013). In biomedicine and 
biosciences “life itself” became manipulable (Franklin, 2000). Rose and Abi-Rached argue that 
developments in neurosciences, biochemistry, and biomedicine finally provided evidence that the 
brain is the home of the mind and contributed to the materialization of the mind in the brain. The 
neuromolecular vision of the brain materialized cognition, emotion, or volition as biophysical, 
chemical, and electrical processes that the brain performs. They rearticulated the knowable 
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capacities of the brain and created possible interventions, for example, through psychiatric 
pharmacology that has the capacity to alter DNA sequences or epigenetic makeup. 
Due to its links with eugenics, the often-critiqued field of psychiatric genetics reached 
new understanding that overcame genetic inheritances by describing “changes in single bases in 
the DNA sequences” and how those might lead to “susceptibility to certain diseases or response 
to particular drugs” (Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013, p. 11). Neuroplasticity removed the notion of 
structural limitations due to fixed genes and introduced the dimension of time from fertilization 
through the following decades of life. Notions of synaptic connection formation and “rewiring” 
not only reinvigorated rehabilitation from brain damage but also produced new regimes of truth 
for the early periods of life. Moreover, as Rose and Abi-Rached (p. 12) further explain, 
“Epigenetic arguments sought to establish the ways in which experience ‘gets under the skin’ at 
the level of the genome itself.” Intrauterine and early childhood experiences are considered 
fundamentally life shaping allowing environmental aspects, such as “optimal maternal care,” to 
be passed down for generations. Neurogenesis proved this link by providing evidence about the 
production of nerve cells after the first year of life as an effect of environmental experiences. 
Visual imaginaries of the brain provided insights not only into its structure but also into the its 
functioning. These were then linked to mental processes and mental states from happiness to 
political allegiance (2013). 
While these findings and their interpretations are highly contestable, overall they have 
provided a “belief that we can see the mind in the living brain” (Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013, p. 
13). The visualization of the mind made the brain a logical target for the governance of 
individual conduct and the formation of new concepts of personhood. The explanatory power of 
neuroscience and biosciences provide a knowledge base, new notions of personhood, and 
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imagination of the future to mix with human capital. They make life and reasoning attached to 
the brain (and mind) itself an additional target for policy interventions that result in 
reconceptualization of policy agendas and practical prescriptions. 
By the twenty-first century, as Rose and Abi-Rached (2013, p. 14) argue, (the industrial 
North) societies have 
moved from the risk management of almost everything to a general regime of futurity. 
The future now presents us neither with ignorance nor with fate, but with probabilities, 
possibilities, a spectrum of uncertainties and the potential for the unseen and the 
unexpected and the untoward. 
Governments thus engaged with the “government of the future” and contemporary 
problematizations of the brain and life became central to notions of futurity and the canvassing 
of social and economic problems. Entwined with human capital theory, the alteration of 
biological processes has the potential to provide some intervention, prevention, or calculation to 
prepare for uncertain futures. 
Governing the Brain through ECEC and Families 
In current international early childhood discourses (White, 2011), “brain research” puts forward 
the view that optimal early brain development necessitates quality early education to stimulate 
synaptic growth. The external environment impacts on neurobiology and influences the health 
and well-being of young children. Therefore “optimal stimulation” is vital (Shonkoff & Phillips, 
2000). The importance of early brain development is often linked to international economic 
competitiveness. 
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In these discourses, the plasticity of the human brain is understood as an “economic 
resource,” where the biology and genetics of individuals represent “raw (biological) materials” 
and correct nurturing practices are linked to ensure the vitality of the nation in a volatile future. 
And those who have immediate influence on healthy pregnancy and optimal brain stimulation 
during the earliest days and months, including entire families but especially mothers, become 
protagonists (Edwards et al., 2013) to reach economic and governmental ends or to provide some 
predictability for the future. As so vividly described by Edwards and her colleagues, prenatal 
courses and parenting education are also reshaped by these knowledges to govern mothers’ 
conduct: 
Pregnant women and new mothers are the explicit targets, reflecting the resurgence of old 
and highly contentious tenets of attachment theory . . . The quality of care is claimed to 
be reflected in the anatomical structure of the child’s neural circuits with sensitive 
mothers producing “more richly networked brains.” (p. 5) 
Neuroscience discourses also decode sociality in biological terms, since it is argued that early 
social relations, including most importantly pre- and postnatal relationships, are coded in 
genetics (based on epigenetic research findings on rat mothers that engage in high or low 
amounts of licking/grooming and arched-back nursing of their pups); thus these codes are passed 
on to future generations (Fish, Shahrokh, Bagot, Caldji, Bredy, Szyf, & Meaney, 2004).2 This 
coding enables the capacity for living in groups; therefore, parents should understand that earliest 
interactions have ramifications also for generations to come. Parents are asked to learn to 
understand their minds, including their empathy, emotionality, fairness, and commitment to 
others to pass “optimal” relations down to the next generations and consequently “to maximize 
the mental capital and moral order of society as a whole” (Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013, p. 22). 
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This form of parenting requires particular forms of self-awareness from parents. Since the 
process of hardwiring the brain is hypothesized to be finished by three years of age, there is a 
need for very early “optimal care” and intervention, which in turn infuses much policy and 
practice literature and focuses on families and most prominently early maternal care and 
relationships. In particular, narrow ideas about rigid “critical” or “sensitive windows” of 
development are overemphasized, where lack of a certain type of parental stimulation early on in 
a child’s first years is posed as causing permanent stunting in many areas graphically represented 
by images of the “pruned” brain. In sum, ideas and visuals attached to the neuromolecular, 
plastic, and visible brain provide avenues to intervene on the brain and the mind and therefore 
produce new targets and techniques of governing the individual and population that are attached 
to existing forms of interventions, such as those offered by the “human sciences,” including early 
education and most particularly optimal parenting. 
Neuroscience cannot provide instant solutions for the classroom. Therefore applied 
research bridges the gap between laboratory and classroom settings to find ways to increase 
“mental capital” (Howard-Jones, n.d.; Howard-Jones & Fenton, 2012, p. 121). Neuroeducation at 
John Hopkins University or at the University of Bristol works on developing new techniques to 
intervene in the brain. Academic research in ECEC also plays an active role in translating 
neuroscientific findings into classroom applications in areas of intervention ranging from 
learning theory and development to social problems. A good example is the special issue of 
Early Education and Development 23(1) in 2012 themed “ Perspectives in Early Development 
and Education” that “provides the opportunity to acquire enlightening new perspectives on 
familiar topics such as learning and cognition, socio-emotional development and self-regulation, 
reading and mathematics, the effects of poverty, early intervention, schoolreadiness, and 
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teaching practices” (Twardosz & Bell, 2012, p. 1). Conferences, popularizing presentations, and 
workshops organized on the various interlinkages, such as between media and technology and 
brain science, are translating these connections to parents and practitioners in a popular but 
nonetheless simplistic and deterministic format, for example, “Parents want their children to 
have a healthy lifestyle with healthy food, exercise and a wide range of valuable experiences, but 
often forget that healthy neural development must take into account screen time and the impacts 
on the wiring of developing brains.”3 Similar conferences that offer better utilization of the 
mind’s capacities (“Change your brain for a better life” to “Maximize your motivation and 
performance” or “brain gym”) building on neuroscientific evidence and combined with positive 
psychology or mindful awareness (Zelazo & Lyons, 2012) are many. Ever broader audiences are 
recruited to attend, from psychologists to educators, from doctors to lay people.4 Similar content 
is taken up in training programs that aim to “raise public awareness about new findings in brain 
research and to educate everyone who has an impact on the early life of . . . children about the 
important implications of this knowledge”5 or that directly develop programs for the educators of 
young children, such as the MindUp program funded by The Hawn Foundation6 and popularized 
by the Benevolent Society in Australia7 to train teachers in primary and preschool education. 
However, as Pykett (2012) warns, teachers become “mechanic[s] of the brain” and their 
pedagogical and content expertise turns out to be less valuable than the superior expertise of the 
brain scientist. 
Regulation of Very Young “Neuro-Citizens” 
Neurosciences re-created humans as “subjects of [novel] deliberations and decision that opened 
also new space of hope and fear . . . around genetic and somatic individuality” (Rose & Novas, 
2002, p. 36). The idea of “somatic individuality” accounts for direct relations between body and 
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self. By providing descriptions and judgments, for example, about blood pressure, heart rhythm, 
or blood cholesterol, biomedical languages moved from scientific discourse into the lay expertise 
of citizens. They also convey a new responsibility to add such factors to the list of things 
individuals are responsible for controlling in order to become “productive citizens.” Similarly, 
biogenetic and neuroscientific truths are also being translated into ideas of personhood that 
extend somatic individualization into forms of “neuro individualization.” As Novas and Rose 
continue their explanation, 
Like earlier languages—that of intelligence, or that of “hormones”—these genetic 
languages render visible to others and to oneself aspects of human individuality that go 
beyond “experience,” not only making sense of it in new ways, but actually reorganizing 
it in a new way and according to new values about who we are, what we must do, and 
what we can hope for. (2000, p. 488) 
In this way, techniques developed earlier in “psy” sciences for the regulation and self-fashioning 
of the person (Rose, 1989) have spread to the somatic self and now are “gradually extending 
from the body to the embodied mind—the brain” (Rose & Abi-Rached, 2013, p. 22) or the 
embrained individual. The optimization of brain functioning or mental capital through 
psychology, psychiatry, and pharmaceutical products is a growing trend and is written about in 
relation to education (for the latest, see Harwood and Allen’s [2014] or for earlier, see Graham 
[2007]). The screening of a brain’s physiological “malfunctioning” and the administration and 
later self-administration of drugs provide ways to avoid delinquency in school and criminality 
later in life. 
Biomedicine and biosciences also provided ways to redefine mental capital as written in 
genetic codes. This includes the genetic makeup of a person and also the experiences of previous 
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generations inherited through epigenetics. Mental capital is understood as the potential for either 
“optimal” brain development and functioning given optimal stimulation or “genetic 
susceptibility” to particular diseases attacking the brain. Genetic susceptibility creates new 
categories of individuals as “the asymptomatically ill” (Novas & Rose, 2000, p. 496) where the 
body is conceived as “molecular software that may be read or rewritten” (Lemke, 2005, p. 5). 
Genetic susceptibility potentially leads to stigmatization, minoritization, and the creation of a 
new “underclass” (Novas & Rose, 2000) where this recalibration of disadvantage removes any 
societal responsibility. As suggested by Corrie (2000) and Einboden and colleagues (2013, p. 
563), “the production of children as subjects of social value, figured as human capital, 
investments in the future, or alternatively, as waste” based on their parents’ and educators’ 
capacity to exploit or “waste” their children’s “critical periods,” might reconstruct children from 
particular backgrounds as irredeemable to society (Corrie, 2000). This vision also offers 
politicians new ways to argue with neuroscience to avoid class connections or categorization of 
people (Edwards et al., 2013). Thus, neuroscience offers ways to overcome class differentials in 
the governing of the population by moving into the biological processes of the body that 
seemingly equalize all humans. 
Interventions to safeguard the mental capital of the nation can then be targeted as 
intervention at the molecular or genetic level coupled with the development of a whole array of 
medical and educational assessment regimes, including the mobilization of children’s self-
actualization by making both them and their parents responsible for their genetic makeup and 
environmental circumstances. In this way, the governing of parents’ and children’s conduct 
targets their choices and prudence or lack of it, following a “somatic” or “neuro” ethics (Novas 
& Rose, 2000; Rose & Novas, 2002). Through neuroeducation, particular pedagogies and 
23 
curriculum have been and are being designed that educate about correct choices by linking them 
to possible scenarios, and make families, educators, and children responsible to make the right 
choices by creating solid foundations keeping in sight the probabilities, possibilities, and the 
unexpected in their lives. 
For those who are not “asymptomatically ill,” the same strategies offer ways to maximize 
their potential, as John Bruer notes. As soon as early years advocates promoted the first three 
years of life as critical for brain development, middle-class parents became consumers of brain-
based products and activities that would help their children to achieve educationally (in Edwards 
et al., 2013). Moreover, somatic techniques, such as neurofeedback that provides “conscious” 
control learned by identifying signs of optimal brain functioning with the help of electronic 
gadgets, assume direct links for the governing of the mind through self-regulation. As a seventh 
grade student expresses on the MindUP website, “It is a way to focus your mind, calm down and 
reflect on a situation when you need to make a choice.”8 These links re-create human will and 
decision making into choices based on sensations and visual images coming from one’s body. 
Discussion 
In summary, in this chapter I laid out the shifting logics according to which expert knowledges 
and human capital theory have worked in tandem to tie together particular behaviors acquired 
through education and the market. This pushes individuals to become “useful” members of their 
society and to facilitate the nation’s economic goals. I examined how these discourses utilize 
particular constructions of the “human,” the person to be educated and governed through 
policies, to prepare the analysis in the second part of this chapter in which I argued that 
neurosciences not only provide new expert knowledges to reconceptualize the person in terms of 
human capital theory but also effect a shift in the government of the individual where the 
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biological processes become the target of regulation instead of human capacities described in 
aptitudes. 
Based on neuroscientific expert knowledges, in new narratives of human capital, parents 
(predominantly mothers) and children (persons and biological raw materials) themselves are the 
protagonists (with some help from educators) to have or build solid genetic or neural foundations 
and to make choices in the hope of effecting the probable, possible, or the unexpected in their 
lives. Foundations for mental capital are to be built through a neuro/somatic ethics by creating 
optimal environments that have the potential to affect subsequent generations as well as the 
current ones and by targeting molecular processes through mind training or drugs. Through a 
particular futurity and responsibility for the next generations to come, the goal of these self-
governing techniques are to ensure a moral society for the future and the creation of mental 
capital to fund the very capacities required to act in an undescribable future to come. In an 
interactive manner between human capital theory and the neurosciences, human capital theory 
shifts from the acquisition of aptitudes to the acquisition of those behaviors that fund the genetics 
of current and future generations, safeguard against futures written in genetic susceptibility, and 
through regulation and self-government ensure the molecular and “mindful” access to the human 
mind. In return, neurosciences will be expected to provide more avenues and practical strategies 
by working together with applied sciences, such as health, education, and so on for the effective 
regulation of the population and individuals applied through policy. 
To finish I tie together all the threads developed in the chapter by restating them after 
each other to be able to draw a conclusion. There is a new focus on self-monitoring and the 
training of our brains/minds where younger and younger children are required to develop self-
awareness of brain functions—or the actual functioning of their mind. Parenting becomes crucial 
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in children’s brain development due to the sensitive period tied to the period of intrauterine life 
and birth to three years of age. People who are socially or economically disadvantaged are 
rethought as individuals whose “condition” derived from “non-optimal” brain environments or 
their susceptibility that makes them “asymptomatically ill.” These reconfigurations taken 
together in narratives of human capital and the purpose of education might ultimately lead to the 
devaluation of and further disinvestment from institutional ECEC. This might be coupled with 
the overvaluation of maternal care, maternal education and self-government, and a radical 
change in pedagogy and curricula for a healthy and well-funded brain—our brain capital. 
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1 For	   example,	   the	   new	   Ministerial	   Advisory	   Council	   for	   Child	   Care	   and	   Early	   Learning	   was	  established	   on	   July	   26,	   2014,	   to	   discuss	   strategic	   policies	   for	   ECEC	   by	   representing	   a	   range	   of	  perspectives	   (https://education.gov.au/news/ministerial-­‐advisory-­‐council-­‐child-­‐care-­‐and-­‐early-­‐learning).	   Membership	   includes	   Ms.	   Naomi	  Wilson	   who	   is	   a	   biofeedback	   practitioner	   utilizing	  scientific	  findings	  of	  neuroscience	  (http://www.bcia.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=3524_).	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2 Popularized,	  for	  example,	  in	  http://discovermagazine.com/2013/may/13-­‐grandmas-­‐experiences-­‐leave-­‐epigenetic-­‐mark-­‐on-­‐your-­‐genes 
3 http://childrenandmedia.org.au/events/accm-conference 
4 http://www.mindanditspotential.com.au/ 
5 http://www.brainwave.org.nz/ 
6 http://thehawnfoundation.org/mindup/ 
7 http://benevolent.org.au/think/doing-things-differently/shaping-brains/mindup 
8 http://thehawnfoundation.org/mindup/ 
